The Libyan army, affiliated with the legitimate government, was able to turn the conflict equation upside down, and moved from defense to attack, after it launched Operation “Peace Storm,” which resulted in the liberation of all the cities of the West Coast, the Al-Watiya Air Base, towns in the Western Mountain, and 3 strategic camps in Tripoli, and destroyed 9 Pantsir air defense systems, and forced the mercenaries of the Russian Wagner company to withdraw from the south of the capital, after they dominated the battle skies. In light of the faltering revolutions of the Arab Spring in Egypt, Syria, and Yemen, the Libyan revolutionary progress represented an awaited sign of hope for the peoples of the Arab Spring, especially with the continued flow of promising news that Haftar’s forces were failing, the turmoil in his supporter’s camp, and the withdrawal of hundreds of mercenaries from the fighting axes in the Libyan capital.
Reality now
In general, anyone who has been following the progress of the battles for about three and a half months will inevitably realize that Haftar lost the western wing of the battle, which extends from Al-Watiya Air Base (170 km southwest of Tripoli) to the cities of Sabratha (70 km west of Tripoli) and Sorman (60 km west of the capital). The heart of the army was also lost in the city of Gharyan (100 km south of Tripoli), which receives supplies from Benghazi (east) to Al-Jufra Air Base and from there to Gharyan, and through it supplies are distributed across the fighting axes in the Warshafana region and south of Tripoli, and the majority of the forces in this region are from eastern Libya and from Chadian and Sudanese mercenaries. All that remains for Haftar’s forces is the eastern wing, which extends from Tarhuna, passing through the town of Al-Subaie’a, to the fighting fronts south of Tripoli. The majority of these forces belong to the 9th Brigade, Tarhuna (west), in addition to forces from the east, and supplies come to them from the town of Bani Walid via its civil airport, or through a long land road linking it to Al-Jufra Air Base, passing through the town of Al-Shuwayrif (450 km south of Tripoli). Currently, Haftar’s forces are concentrated in the Qasr Bin Ghashir area (the southern suburb of Tripoli), and share control with the Al-Wefaq forces over the areas of the old Tripoli Airport (decommissioned in 2014), Ain Zara, Khallet Al-Furjan, Wadi Al-Rabi’, and Al-Zatarna, south of Tripoli.
Haftar is lost among his supporters
After the Al-Wefaq forces took control of the operations room of Haftar’s forces in the city of Gharyan, the latter was expected to move the command and control room to the city of Tarhuna (90 km southeast of Tripoli), as it is the main supply center for the fighting axes south of Tripoli after the fall of Gharyan, but Haftar moved the operations room to Al-Jufra Air Base, which is about 600 km away from the center of the battles towards the southeast. Haftar appointed Mabrouk Al-Ghazawi as commander of the Tripoli Operations Room, succeeding Abdul Salam Al-Hassi, after his defeat in Gharyan. As for Saleh Aboudah, he leads the advanced operations room, the position of which has not yet been announced. Failure to transfer the operations room to Tarhuna confirms what is circulating in the media about disputes between the 9th Brigade in Tarhuna and Haftar’s forces coming from the east, and reflects a lack of trust between the two parties, and the latter’s fear of being stabbed in the back like what happened to her in Gharyan. The commander of the Al-Wefaq Forces Operations Room in Tripoli, Ahmed Boushehmah, referred to this matter in media statements, saying: “There are sharp disputes between Haftar’s forces coming from the east and the Kani militia (Ninth Brigade Tarhuna), which led to the withdrawal of one of Haftar’s brigades” from one of the fighting axes south of Tripoli.
He doesn’t have much anymore
Haftar’s forces in general lost the battle of Tripoli, and only the Ninth Tarhuna Brigade remained fighting stubbornly, despite its deep differences with Haftar’s forces coming from the east. However, his withdrawal from the battle now means that the Al-Wefaq forces will devote himself to him after eliminating his allies in the east. Therefore, continuing the fighting is a matter of life or death for the Ninth Brigade. Also, Haftar, who is known for his stubbornness, is unlikely to decide to withdraw from the outskirts of Tripoli, despite his forces suffering hundreds of deaths, and perhaps thousands of wounded and hundreds of prisoners, because that would harm his pride and self-esteem, and shake his image before his supporters at home and his allies abroad. The matter will not stop there, as it may lead to defections and rebellion within the ranks of his forces, and the countries supporting him may search for an alternative to succeed him at the head of the forces. Arif Nayed, Libya’s ambassador to the UAE, is one of these options that is currently being promoted as a “successor” to Haftar, so the battle of Tripoli has become a matter of life or death for the latter.
Arab Spring recovery
The UAE, Egypt and France, Haftar’s biggest supporters, view the battle of Tripoli from a more comprehensive perspective, as Haftar’s defeat means a victory for the Arab Spring, which has almost waned, before the new wave emerges in Algeria and Sudan, and any faltering of Haftar’s forces in Libya will constitute additional support for the Islamists in Tunisia. There are great fears among the UAE and Egypt about the completion of the “Arab Spring Crescent,” extending from Algeria to Sudan via Tunisia and Libya, which may reach the rest of the Arab countries. As for Paris, its bet on the battle of Tripoli is linked to its bet on Haftar in fighting “terrorist” and extremist groups, which have special extensions in northern Mali, Niger and Chad, where French forces are present. Losing the battle of Tripoli means the collapse of Haftar’s project, in which Paris invested a lot, which may turn Libya once again into a “jungle of militias,” and terrorist groups such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda are good at investing in chaos.
A war over identity
Accordingly, it is unlikely that Haftar’s forces will withdraw in the near future, given the fate of the Tripoli battle, especially since Haftar’s forces have strong positions in the city of Tarhuna and at the Al-Watiya base, as well as a popular incubator in the Warshafana region, and part of the city of Zintan (140 km south of Tripoli). Therefore, Haftar’s forces from the western region will fight more fiercely than the forces coming from the east, which will prolong the life of the battle. It seems that the visit of the UN envoy to Libya, Ghassan Salamé, to Bani Walid, which has maintained its neutrality for 8 years, comes within the framework of its playing a role in reconciliation between the Ninth Brigade of Tarhuna and the Al-Wefaq Forces. If the former withdraws from the battle, Haftar’s forces will not be able to hold out for long south of Tripoli, and intensifying UN and international pressure on the countries supporting Haftar would push them to take steps backwards in the project to destroy Libya.
